Florida seeks $250k fine against Orlando drop tower operator for teen death

I still wonder who, if anyone, will ultimately be found responsible. Someone modified the restraint and there was probably a reason. Did the park owner ask for it? A ride supervisor? A bored teenage operator?

Sounds like it'll be the operating entity and nothing more. I mean, what's the "chain of custody" of the ride and how do you know when the bad adjustment was made?

Maybe not a bored ride op, but one having to turn away a lot of big guests. I can see someone asking about it and someone with the brilliant idea of making a couple of the restraints less restrictive. Who is responsible? The one who turned the wrench?

Not only that, but...

Who is to say that adjusting the switch had anything at all to do with the incident?

The manual says NOTHING about using the go/!go indicators to determine whether riders are properly secured. It notes that it is the responsibility of the ride operator to insure that the rider is "properly" seated and secured on the ride.

The manual says NOTHING about the minimum restraint closed position and NOTHING about the proper location of the go/!go switch. The switch is there because ASTM F2291-20:6.4.3.8(5)* (and probably the relevant section of EN 13814-1:2019) require it to be there. The manual is silent on what the proper adjustment of that switch is, and is not very helpful in defining what it means for a rider to be "properly secured"; presumably that's one of the things the certified operator learns from the required manufacturer-supplied training program.

I don't remember the exact context, but I brought up this point during an ASTM meeting: that by requiring the go/!go indicator, we are effectively setting up an environment where the *largest* allowable restraint opening has to be considered "safe" for the *smallest* allowable rider. Because we're defining a restraint position that is considered "correct" (the exact word used in F2291-20:6.4.3.8(5)) and therefore it needs to be "correct" for all riders. That's why the seats have been getting less accommodating even though the adjustable restraints should actually make them *more* accommodating. When I mentioned this, a representative of a European manufacturer disagreed with me, indicating that, while this is my experience with the way these indicators are used in US operations, it's not how they intend their products to be used. That's also what the language in the Funtime (an Austrian company) manual indicates. The switch detects that some effort was made to close the restraint, but the manual explicitly avoids using the indicator to indicate anything about the safety of the restrained rider.

My argument, then, is that while changing the switch position did allow for the ride to operate in a manner for which it was not designed, there is no specification for where that switch is supposed to be located, or for the maximum open position of the shoulder bar for operation. The ride operation manual throws responsibility for this incident directly onto the attendant who checked Tyre's restraint.

Please note, I am not saying that's proper, or that it is fair, or that it's the way things should be. I'm saying that according to the ride operations and maintenance manual, that's the situation that exists. I'd also like to point out that it should be possible on that ride to include a second limit switch so that it COULD accommodate a larger rider...by inhibiting the seat tilt if the restraint is not closed past the second limit switch. But that's merely my opinion; I obviously haven't done the risk analysis on this ride.

--Dave Althoff, Jr.

* ASTM F2291-20:6.4.3.8(5)-- Type of External Correct or Incorrect Indication—An external indication is required. Detecting the failure of any monitored device shall either bring the ride to a cycle stop or inhibit cycle start.

It looks like the first and most obvious thing the investigator did was measure the gap of the minimally closed restraint. I don't care what the standards say, it seems like common sense that the manufacturer should have indicated what that was supposed to be. There had to be a defined threshold, otherwise the entire design of the seat is arbitrary.

Oh, I totally agree with you on that. There had to be some kind of standard otherwise the switch position is entirely arbitrary (in which case who cares if it gets changed?) and relying on it for go/!go clearance is not just inappropriate, but dangerous.

What's that about common sense being not so common?

Incidentally one of my dreams is for the entirety of ASTM F2291:6.4.3 to be completely abolished. That's the whole section on restraint requirements due to acceleration and seat inclination, including all that class 1-class 5 stuff. That would still require the risk analysis and would still require the design and implementation of appropriate restraints, but it removes a lot of the cookbook stuff and the irrational objection to shared lap bars on more aggressive rides.

--Dave Althoff, Jr.

In my amateur reading of various standards, I think what gets lost is intended outcomes. The problem with being prescriptive in engineering is that you either limit innovation or they overlook use cases that no one previously thought of. Then you can meet the standard but not comply to its intent. I don't know if ASTM reads like that, but it wouldn't surprise me.

I think railing against prescriptivity (is that even a word? OS-X doesn't seem to think so...) is in the justification for almost every negative vote I have ever cast.

The F24 standards are modern standards written for an ancient business, and there has been a certain amount of effort made to stick to performance rather than prescription, because the "service proven" magic wand is such a cop-out, and makes so little sense. If a ride has been operating for the better part of a century without serious issues, then it makes sense that any newly implemented standards should allow for the design and construction of an equivalent ride. Sure, now we're going to require stricter engineering standards...in the 1920's rides were built twice as heavy as the engineer thought it needed to be; today the same ride can be optimized, and the engineer can show his work to "prove" that the ride is mechanically sound. The old ride was no less so, but the calculations weren't as complex or as robust.

Because many of us are looking at proposals with an eye towards, "What does this make illegal, and do we approve of that outcome?" along with the need for Owner/Operators to comply with the requirements of the authorities having jurisdiction, the standards tend to do a reasonable job of staying performance driven. Not always, but most of the time.

--Dave Althoff, Jr.